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1This report describes the Urban Institute’s 
microsimulation model of reinsurance, which 
was built to simulate the impacts of various 
state-specific ways of using state-funded reinsur-
ance to subsidize primary insurance premiums. 
The type of reinsurance modeled reimburses 
primary carriers at the end of a year for the 
insured health care spending that falls within a 
specified “corridor” of aggregate annual indi-
vidual medical claims expense—e.g., reinsurance 
of 90 percent of expenses between $30,000 and 
$90,000 per person per year.
This work was done as part of the Reinsurance 
Institute, a project of the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation’s State Coverage Initiatives program, 
administered by AcademyHealth, and the Urban 
Institute, that provided technical assistance to 
competitively selected states interested in using 
reinsurance as an aspect of health financing reform. 
A companion report describes the overall project, 
including the qualitative elements of our work that 
complemented the quantitative modeling described 
here.1 Results of the modeling are reported in 
deliverables to the participating states.2
Four Steps in Modeling the 
Effects of Reinsurance
Predicting the effects of reinsurance reform 
options within our three states of Rhode Island, 
Washington, and Wisconsin involved four 
main tasks:
Creating a baseline database that reflects each 
state’s distribution of health insurance coverage, 
demographic characteristics, individual health 
expenditures, employer characteristics, and 
health insurance premiums paid by employer 
group and non-group purchasers of coverage;
Modeling the reinsurance policy and estimating the 
changes in premiums that would result from each 
particular reinsurance reform option considered;
Estimating the effects of those premium 
changes on employers’ health insurance offer 
behavior and on individuals’ take-up of group 
and non-group coverage; and
Computing expected changes in health care expen-
ditures and costs to the state for each reinsurance 
option simulated, as well as summarizing the 
changes in health insurance coverage expected to 
result for different populations of interest.
Step 1. Creating a Baseline Database 
for Each State
Comprehensive modeling of the effects of rein-
surance policies in a state requires individual-
level data that are population-based, so that 
we can simulate the costs and behavior of the 
uninsured. Data on insurance claims alone are 
insufficient. A useful model also requires data 
that are representative of state health expendi-
tures and coverage, demographic characteristics, 
and employer characteristics. Additionally, since 
reinsurance policies affect the composition of 
the risk pools for each insurance product, simu-
lation of reinsurance requires that the baseline 
data also characterize the health expenditure 
profile and number of individuals enrolling in 
coverage together in each risk pool.
Finally, modeling reinsurance requires having 
an accurate distribution of health care expenses 
in the upper tail of the distribution across risk 
groups, because some reinsurance options can 
be expected to target such very high expendi-
tures. The implication of this final requirement 
is that the data need to have a sufficiently large 
number of observations to obtain an adequate 
number of “extreme” cases in the health expen-
diture distribution.
Unfortunately, there are no state-level datasets 
that possess all these features. Thus, this proj-
ect built state-representative databases from 
multiple national and state-level data sources. 
Baseline database construction augments and 
adjusts national MEPS data in a number of 
ways (Exhibit 1). The goal of each adjustment 
was to augment MEPS-HC data or correct them 
for a known shortcoming, each time using the 
best available information. The end result was a 
baseline database for each state that well reflects 
known characteristics of the state.
The key steps of constructing the baseline data-
base are labeled A through I in Exhibit 1. They 
are discussed in turn below.
Baseline Step A: Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey-Household Component (MEPS-HC)
Our primary source of individual-level data 
was the MEPS-HC.3 This survey is nationally 
representative (of the non-institutionalized U.S. 
population), population-based, and covers more 
than 30,000 individuals in each survey year. 
Annual data are released approximately two 
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Exhibit 1. Construction of Baseline Database: Flowchart of Steps from National Spending Data to State-Specific Premiums
Source: Authors’ graphic.
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years after they are collected. The MEPS-HC 
provides detailed information on individuals’ 
medical spending by source of payment, insur-
ance coverage, income, employment (industry, 
establishment size, hourly wage, hours worked, 
insurance offer at work), and health status. Not 
only does MEPS-HC contain information on 
the uninsured that are lacking in claims data, 
but it also contains household-level informa-
tion needed to simulate how reinsurance would 
change insurance offers and premiums.
To build our baseline, we pooled together three 
years of the MEPS-HC data (2001–2003). Pooling 
increased the number of individuals in the database 
with very high medical costs, who are the focus of 
the reinsurance policy options that we expected 
to simulate. We adjusted the previous one-year 
weighting factors of MEPS-HC data into new 
weights whose application to the three-year sample 
yielded estimates summing to the 2003 national 
population as estimated in the MEPS.
MEPS-HC health expenditure dollar amounts 
were inflated to 2007 dollars using inflation factors 
from the National Health Expenditure Accounts 
(NHEA) of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services (CMS).4 We made these adjustments 
separately by type of service. Income and wage 
dollar values were inflated to 2007 dollars using the 
Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners 
and Clerical Workers (CPI-W).5 
Baseline Step B: “Stretching” the distribu-
tion of MEPS-HC health care expenditures
The MEPS-HC is known to understate total 
health expenditures, as some high medical cost 
populations are outside the scope of the survey’s 
sample (e.g., institutionalized persons). Their 
absence creates a downward bias in the number 
of high-expenditure respondents in the dataset. 
In order to correct for this shortfall, we adjusted 
the distribution of privately insured health expen-
ditures in the MEPS-HC in order to match the 
distribution observed in a large claims database 
of privately insured expenses maintained by the 
Society of Actuaries (SOA). (This database is a 
good source on high-cost cases in the private 
sector.) The private claims are from 1999, and we 
initially inflated them to 2007 dollars.6 
Details on Methods Used: To identify the shortfall 
with more precision, we compared the distribu-
tion of SOA claims per person year with those 
calculated from MEPS-HC for employer-spon-
sored insurance (ESI) coverage. Specifically, we 
computed the ratio of SOA to MEPS-HC for 
each percentile of spending from the first to the 
99th. We found that in the top eight percentiles, 
from the 92nd to the 99th percentiles, the SOA-
to-MEPS-HC ratio was greater than one, indi-
cating an undercount of very high expenditures 
in the MEPS, relative to SOA. We therefore 
multiplied MEPS-HC private health care expen-
ditures by the corresponding ratios for expendi-
ture values in the top eight percentiles.
This stage of adjustment addressed the distribu-
tion of claims from low to high, not the overall 
amounts of spending (for which SOA is not a 
good source). Accordingly, we kept the SOA 
stretching from affecting aggregate private 
expenditures by multiplying each expenditure 
by an overall constant factor. Thus, our SOA 
stretching method changed the shape of the 
expenditure distribution, while being expendi-
ture-neutral overall.
Baseline Step C: Adjusting for expenditures 
under-reported in MEPS
According to previous studies, health expenditures 
in the MEPS-HC routinely undercount certain 
expenditures, such as laboratory tests, that survey 
respondents find harder to recall.7 In order to 
address this discrepancy, we used these studies to 
compare MEPS-HC health expenditures within 
payers and services to the NHEA, and we applied 
an adjustment to each payer’s expenditure within 
each type of service category to be in accordance 
with the adjusted NHEA estimates. In contrast, 
the recall and reporting of out-of-pocket (OOP) 
spending by household survey respondents in the 
MEPS-HC is thought to be a relative strength of 
the dataset. (In fact, we found a smaller percentage 
difference between the MEPS-HC and the adjust-
ed NHEA for OOP spending.) Accordingly, we 
did not adjust the MEPS OOP spending to reach 
NHEA out-of-pocket estimates.
Baseline Step D: Making other adjustments 
to MEPS-HC spending data
This step had two components:
1. Estimating uninsured persons’ expenditures when insured. 
If the number of uninsured people in a state is 
reduced, we would expect overall health expendi-
tures in the state to increase because insured people 
tend to utilize more health services than otherwise 
identical people who are uninsured.8 For uninsured 
individuals in the baseline database, we used a 
statistical matching method (i.e., predictive mean 
matching) to impute what their health expenditures 
would have been if they had been insured. We 
drew imputed values for each uninsured individual 
from the set of health care expenditures of insured 
individuals in the baseline database who had similar 
demographic characteristics and health status, as 
summarized by a regression prediction of health 
care expenditures on the insured population.
Standard “Modal” Benefit Package Deductible (2007$) Coinsurance
Maximum OOP 
Amount (2007$)
Washington and Wisconsin
ESI Benefit Package
$350 (single)
$700 (family)
20% (single)
20% (family)
$1750 (single)
$3500 (family)
Non-group Benefit Package
$1500 (single)
$3000 (family)
20% (single)
20% (family)
$3000 (single)
$6000 (family)
Rhode Island
ESI Benefit Package
$0 (single)
$0 (family)
5% (single)
5% (family)
$1750 (single)
$3500 (family)
Non-group Benefit Package
$400 (single)
$800 (single)
20% (single)
20% (family)
$3000 (single)
$6000 (family)
Exhibit 2. Cost-sharing Characteristics Used in Standardizing Health Expenditures
32. Standardizing health care expenditures. Standardized 
health care expenditures are needed to calculate 
premiums accurately for individuals purchasing 
together in the same risk pool. The measures of 
total and out-of-pocket health expenditures in the 
MEPS-HC data, however, reflect the particular 
cost-sharing characteristics of the health insurance 
coverage that the surveyed individual/family had 
actually experienced as of the time of the survey. 
This fourth step in the construction of our baseline 
dataset standardized health expenditures to remove 
variation attributable to differences in cost-sharing.
Details on Methods Used: The standardization 
involved three steps as follows. 
1. We first defined the cost-sharing characteristics 
of a standard health plan for both employer-
sponsored coverage and non-group coverage. 
This was done in terms of a deductible, a coin-
surance rate, and an out-of-pocket maximum. 
The standardized plan values we used for each 
state are shown in Exhibit 2. These values were 
selected after doing an environmental scan of 
popular coverages in each state and discussion 
with key informants.
2. Given the calculated per person total annual 
expenditures, we next adjusted OOP expen-
ditures up or down so that they were consis-
tent with the standard plan. 
3. If step 2 resulted in a lower OOP amount than 
what was reported in the MEPS-HC (implying 
that the standard plan has less cost-sharing) we 
made a positive adjustment (using an induction 
factor) to total expenditures to reflect additional 
utilization that would be “induced” by the more 
generous coverage (i.e., with lower cost sharing). 
Similarly, we made a negative adjustment if step 
2 resulted in a higher out-of-pocket amount. 
Finally, we applied step 2 again, but using the 
new total expenditure value after the induction 
factor had been applied. The standardization/
induction method that we employed is the same 
as that used in the Health Insurance Reform 
Simulation Model (HIRSM) and described in 
its documentation.9 (A limitation: It was not 
feasible to adjust expenditures in different health 
plans owing to the differences in benefits or 
provider refunds.)
Baseline Steps E and F: Reweighting the 
MEPS to resemble a particular state
We re-weighted the national MEPS-HC data 
to make the observations consistent with state-
level benchmarks along a number of dimen-
sions. To do this, we needed a population-based 
micro-dataset for each state that contains vari-
ables shared in common with the MEPS and 
that is representative of the state’s demographic 
composition and health insurance coverage. 
Details on Methods Used: For Rhode Island and 
Wisconsin, the re-weighting dataset was the 
Annual Social and Economic Supplement 
(ASEC) to the CPS.10 We used two pooled 
years of state data (data years 2004 and 2005) to 
produce the state-specific benchmark database. 
While the CPS nominally produces estimates of 
coverage for the immediately past calendar year, 
its estimates are more similar to point-in-time 
coverage estimates from other surveys.11 For the 
reinsurance model, we followed a common con-
vention, and interpreted the CPS yearly cover-
age estimates as estimates of current coverage.
Survey counts of Medicaid enrollment are also 
known to differ from administrative counts. A pre-
liminary re-weighting was applied to the CPS data 
for Rhode Island and Wisconsin to adjust levels 
of Medicaid enrollment, separately for children 
and adults, setting the level to equal the midpoint 
between the CPS estimates of Medicaid coverage 
and state administrative counts. In most states, the 
CPS undercounts the number of Medicaid enroll-
ees relative to administrative totals, but making a 
full adjustment to administrative totals would make 
the rate of uninsurance unrealistically low.12 In 
adjusting the Medicaid totals in each state, we made 
one-third of the adjustment through shifts from 
uninsured to Medicaid status, and two-thirds from 
ESI coverage, in accordance with prior findings.13
For Washington, we used the 2006 Washington 
State Population Survey (WSPS) as the state-
level benchmark file because state officials 
consider this survey more representative of 
Washington than the CPS. No initial adjust-
ments to Medicaid coverage were needed for 
the benchmark database for the WSPS.
Having created a state-representing database 
for each state, we then transformed the national 
MEPS weights into sets of weights that pro-
duced means for variables also in the MEPS-
HC that were nearly identical to the weighted 
means produced by the state-level datasets. The 
steps in this process were to: 
• append the state database to the national 
MEPS database; 
• estimate a probit model of the probability of 
being in the state database as a function of a 
set of common variables (we use health insur-
ance unit [HIU]14 level variables as the covari-
ates for this regression, such as average age in 
the HIU, for reasons we discuss below); and 
• use the predicted probability from this regres-
sion in a formula provided by Barsky et al. to 
adjust the weights of the national MEPS data 
to produce the new set of weights that reflect 
the state.15 
We compared the distribution of variables in 
the re-weighted MEPS with the distribution of 
variables in the state-representing benchmark 
files to check whether they were nearly equal. If 
meaningful differences were present, we refined 
the probit model specification until the differ-
ences were acceptably small.
For each state’s resultant re-weighted MEPS 
file, we performed a further round of re-weight-
ing (cell-based re-weighting) in order to simul-
taneously hit benchmarks for health insurance 
coverage and for employment totals by firm 
size category. The coverage benchmarks are 
the same as those reflected in the state-specific 
benchmark files. As our benchmarks for the 
total number of employees by firm size cat-
egory, we used the midpoint between totals we 
calculated from two sources.  The first source 
was the Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB). 
We supplemented the SUSB with data from the 
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey Insurance 
Component (MEPS-IC)16 in order to align 
the firm size categories from the SUSB and 
the CPS. The second source of employment 
totals was the CPS, which is based on worker-
reported information. We decided to use the 
midpoints between the two sources of estimates 
as our benchmarks for employment by firm size 
categories upon finding that they often differed 
by a substantial amount. 
Baseline Step H: Imputing premiums for 
coverages 
It is helpful to discuss step H (imputing of 
premiums) before G (comparing these imputed 
premiums with observed premiums in each 
state). The two steps were interactive, as G’s 
benchmarking was part of modifying H’s pre-
liminary premium imputations to make them 
final. Premium imputation had two key compo-
nents. First was putting our state-specific indi-
viduals into synthetic establishments based on 
individual’s reported employment characteristics 
(employer offer of health insurance, industry, 
firm size, and number of employer locations).17 
Second was generating applicable firm-specific 
premiums based on their component individu-
4Microsimulation Model for Reinsurance
als’ known medical spending, consistent with 
state rules. 
•  Constructing employer groups/synthetic establish-
ments. Group coverage premiums in the 
model were “built up” from the health 
care expenditures that underlie them. We 
calculated group premiums as the expected 
health care expenditure within a particular 
risk group plus an administrative loading 
factor that varies by firm size. In order to 
compute premiums in this way, we had to 
define employer groups that make up the 
risk pools. 
Details on Methods Used: We created these risk 
pools by aggregating employees into “syn-
thetic establishments” to simulate the current 
structure of the group insurance market in 
each state, particularly for small firms, whose 
insurance is of particular interest to state poli-
cymakers. We placed people together based on 
their reported employer characteristics previ-
ously discussed, and then partitioned them 
into “synthetic establishments” based on the 
average number of employees each of these 
establishments is estimated to have. For exam-
ple, we placed together workers who reported 
employment in an agricultural firm with 1–9 
employees that did offer health insurance to 
employees. Next, we partitioned this group 
of similar employees into “synthetic establish-
ments.” Throughout this process, we used 
data from the SUSB to inform the number of 
synthetic establishments we created, and how 
many employees to place in them. 
For the purposes of sorting individuals into syn-
thetic firms, we needed to expand the number of 
individuals and HIUs in the dataset by replicating 
observations in order to get a sufficient number of 
combinations of worker-types within firm-types. 
In particular, we replicated observations in pro-
portion to their weights, so that each individual 
had the same weight within the expanded dataset. 
There are several reasons for creating a dataset in 
which individuals’ weights do not vary. Using a 
dataset with person-varying weights would impede 
the analysis, because individuals assigned to firms 
would then represent multiple workers within 
the firm (or fractions of workers). Observations 
representing multiple workers within a firm would 
make the distribution of health care expendi-
tures within a firm “lumpier” than it actually is. 
Observations representing fractions of workers 
would make it difficult to operationalize reinsur-
ance rules within a firm that apply to the total 
expenses of each person. Also, it makes better 
intuitive sense to discuss whole individuals rather 
than parts of individuals who take up coverage as 
a result of a reinsurance reform.  
Our use of a constant-weighted dataset for the 
assignment of workers to synthetic firms solved 
several problems, but it raised new challenges as 
well. The expanded dataset needed to preserve 
the correct composition of each health insur-
ance unit. To achieve this, we made replicates 
of whole HIUs based on the average of the 
individual-level weights of the people within the 
HIU. For example, an HIU of three people with 
individual-level weights of 10, 20, and 30 would 
have a mean HIU weight of 20. Therefore, we 
made 20 replicates of each person in the HIU, 
creating 20 complete replicate HIUs. If instead 
we had made 10, 20, and 30 copies of the 
three individuals based on their individual-level 
weights, we would have only 10 complete HIUs, 
and 20 incomplete ones. This would prevent 
an accurate aggregation of health expenditures 
within an HIU when calculating premiums. 
Expanding the dataset by an average HIU-
level weight when individual-level weights are 
heterogeneous within HIU, however, had the 
potential to shift the weighted characteristics of 
the dataset away from our already benchmarked 
values. Consider the HIU of two individuals with 
weights of 1 and 19 in the MEPS-HC, one male 
and one female. The average HIU-level weight 
here would be 10, but using the same value of 
10 for both would give too much weight to the 
male individual and too little weight to the female 
individual, thereby altering benchmarked demo-
graphic estimates if these differences do not bal-
ance out over the dataset as a whole. Fortunately, 
the individual-level weights within the original 
MEPS are sufficiently homogenous within an 
HIU that one can obtain similar demographic esti-
mates using individual or HIU-averaged weights. 
We avoided creating additional intra-HIU weight 
heterogeneity by using only HIU-level variables 
in the re-weighting procedure prior to the replica-
tion of observations. Proceeding in this way, we 
were able to obtain demographic estimates in our 
re-weighted and expanded datasets that closely 
match our state-level benchmarks, while maintain-
ing the structure of each HIU and enabling us to 
assign workers to synthetic firms.
We sorted employees into categories of firm 
size (i.e., 1–9 employees, 10–24 employees, 
25–49 employees, 50–99 employees, and 100 
or more employees18), number of locations, 
industry group, and whether the employee has 
an offer of health insurance coverage. When 
we assigned workers of a particular category 
into their synthetic firm, for those with one 
establishment location, we simply calculated 
the average number of persons per establish-
ment within each category of establishment 
size, industry, and offer status; for these 
employees, establishment size and firm size are 
known to be equal. For those with more than 
one establishment location, we probabilistically 
imputed firm size based on the distribution of 
establishment sizes across firm sizes from the 
SUSB (produced by the U.S. Census Bureau).19 
Within each category of firm size, industry, and 
offer status, employees were sorted randomly 
and then partitioned into synthetic firms with 
an average size equal to the average number of 
employees per firm within their cell. 
Finally, we created a set of firm-level weights 
for use in firm-level analyses so that the 
weighted number of synthetic firms in the 
baseline database matched the state-specific 
targets for the number of firms within each 
firm size and type. We used data from Statistics 
Firm size Administrative Load
1 – 9 employees 36%
10 – 24 employees 27%
25 – 49 employees 22%
50 – 99 employees 17%
100 or more employees 10%
Exhibit 3. Administrative Load Assumptions Used in Constructing Group Premiums21
Note: Firm size = number of employees at all establishment locations; Source: Actuarial Research Corporation.
5of U.S. Businesses (produced by the U.S. 
Census Bureau) and the Medical Expenditure 
Panel Survey Insurance Component (MEPS-IC) 
to create state-specific targets for the number of 
employer firms within each state by firm size, 
industry, number of employer locations, and 
whether they do or do not offer health insur-
ance coverage. 
• Generating baseline premiums for group coverage 
for offering and non-offering establishments. We 
computed the average, standardized covered 
expenditures for each establishment, the 
“pure premium” for each. By pure premium, 
we mean the average of all medical claims 
expenditures. We later apply overall adminis-
trative “loads” to estimate actual market pre-
miums. Pure premium here does not include 
claims adjustment expense. We followed 
each state’s rules regulating the rating of ESI 
premiums in the small-group market in order 
to create a pure premium applicable to each 
firm. To create final premiums simulated for 
each firm, an administrative load that varies 
by firm size (Exhibit 320) was added to arrive 
at premium values for each establishment. 
Each person in an employed health insurance 
unit (HIU) was assigned a group premium 
for single coverage if the person is single, and 
family coverage if the person has a family.
Details on Methods Used: We constructed the 
establishment-level premiums by blending several 
components as follows. The first component that 
entered the premium blend was calculated by col-
lapsing pure premiums for all similarly situated 
HIUs into a pool of shared risk across firm sizes in 
accordance with state regulations. Some states do 
not allow firm size to be used as a rating factor in 
the small-group market. In that case, the model’s 
premiums do not vary based on employer’s size 
among those that are small groups. For large firms 
and for states that allow insurers to vary premiums 
in the small-group market based on the employer’s 
size, the establishment-specific pure premium was 
blended with the broader pool of similarly situated 
risks to create a “blended pure premium.”
In states that limit the use of firm size and other 
characteristics as rating factors among smaller 
businesses, we computed a second component, 
a regression-predicted premium, to be used in 
place of the blended pure premium. We esti-
mated a predicted premium by regressing the 
establishment-specific pure premium on estab-
lishment-level characteristics consistent with 
each state’s regulations regarding the insurers’ 
capacity to vary rates based on employer’s size, 
claims, industry, age and gender of employees 
and dependents, and other factors.
In states that allow premium rates to vary by 
claims experience, we used a third component 
in the calculation of blended pure premium—
the establishment’s standardized actual health 
expenditures for singles and for families.
To summarize, an establishment’s blended pure 
premium for singles and for families were a 
combination of the following three components, 
according to each state’s regulations: average 
standardized health expenditures of all indi-
viduals or families in the applicable risk pool; 
regression-predicted establishment-level health 
expenditures standardized for group coverage, 
where the regression covariates varied according 
to the rating rules allowed in each state, such as 
A Note on Simulated Coverage Available for Small Firms and Actual 
State “Small-Group” Markets
The model considers all coverage to be small-firm coverage where survey respondents 
(and dependents) to report being insured through a small firm. (We have no way of 
checking the insurance regulatory status of survey respondents’ coverages.) If respon-
dents are uninsured at baseline, they are assigned to the small-firm market if their 
dominant insurance connection is to a small firm. In some cases it is not clear through 
what size firm coverage actually comes or could come after reform. For example, this 
can occur where an HIU (family) has two parents working for different sized firms. If both 
are insured, an insured dependent might be covered under either policy. If both are 
uninsured, after reform, take-up might occur under either policy. The model built in the 
assumption that large-group coverage would always be more attractive than small-group 
and that, absent a large-group connection, an HIU will take up the coverage that would 
be primary under conventions used for coordination of coverage (normally, that head of 
household group coverage is primary and other coverage secondary). 
The model’s small-firm market should resemble each state’s “small-group” market, but 
the accuracy of its simulation of reality depends upon what coverages are actually avail-
able to small firms and employees within the state. There may be some association 
health plans that market to small firms or individuals within small firms. There may also 
be non-group coverage sold on a “franchise” basis under which individuals are the poli-
cyholder, not the firm, but the firm arranges for payroll deduction. 
Small firms were modeled as those with 2-49 employees (1-49 in Rhode Island). 
According to insurance practice and regulation, the upper limit should be 50 employees, 
but we were constrained to use 49 because of pre-existing survey definitions of firm size 
categories. For the states simulated, we estimated that only a very small percentage of 
firms or population would fall into firms of exactly 50 employees. 
The model sets firm size by the total number of employees at all establishments, even 
ones outside the state, as that appears to be the predominant mode of counting 
employment for insurance purposes. The number of employees within the state of inter-
est may be small, but the firm still large for insurance purposes.
For Washington only, we partitioned the population within small firms into two groups. In one 
set of simulations, the population to be reinsured were people assumed to have conventional 
small-group coverage (that is, coverages subject to modified community premium rating rules 
that ban use of health status as a factor in premiums). The other group was assumed to get 
coverage from their small firm through an association health plan (AHP). AHPs are regulated 
differently and may use medical underwriting in rating applicants for coverage. 
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industry, age, and gender; and the establishment’s 
standardized actual health expenditures for sin-
gles and for families. We then applied the admin-
istrative load amounts in Exhibit A-3 to these 
“blended pure premiums” by firm size category. 
The final result is a reasonable approximation of 
reality in each state (box).
• Constructing non-group risk pools. We assigned 
individuals reporting non-group health insur-
ance coverage (i.e., individual/direct pay/
self pay coverage) to non-group risk pools 
according to state-specific rating regulations. 
• Generating baseline premiums for non-group coverage. 
Non-group premiums were calculated for each 
siingle and family. We started by calculating a 
non-group “pure premium” for singles and for 
families as a blend of the following components: 
z  Average standardized health expenditures 
of all individuals or families in the non-
group rating cell;22 
z  Regression-predicted health expenditures 
standardized for non-group coverage, 
where the regression covariates vary 
according to the rating rules allowed in 
each state such as age and gender; and 
z  The individual or family’s standardized 
actual health expenditures. 
The first component was intended to capture 
the overall risk pooling in the non-group mar-
ket across individuals within a rating cell. The 
first component was too unstable to reflect the 
expected differences across cells in all cases. 
Therefore, we blended in the second component, 
which produces more stable differences in the 
rating cells. The third component was used to 
build in additional individual-level underwriting. 
Estimates of non-group health insurance pre-
miums obtained from ehealthinsurance.com, as 
well as our discussions with the states, guided our 
choice to blend of these components (60, 10, and 
30 percent of total, respectively). An administra-
tive load of 50 percent was added to the pure 
premium to arrive at a final premium for non-
group coverage in each non-group rating cell.
Baseline Step G: Comparing initially 
simulated premiums with known premium 
benchmarks
After we had “built up” preliminary estimates 
of premiums for group and non-group buy-
ers through the steps above, we compared the 
resultant estimates to estimates of single 
and family group premiums for each state and 
by firm size for the nation as reported in the 
MEPS-IC. We expected average non-group 
premiums to be similar to but higher than those 
for very small groups, and we also made com-
parisons with online quotations of non-group 
premiums, which we expected to be the lower 
bound, as they apply to healthy buyers and 
actual offers may include coverage exclusions 
for existing health conditions. 
After these comparisons, we made further 
adjustments to the levels of health insurance 
expenditures so that the model’s baseline premi-
ums would be comparable to the MEPS-IC and 
other benchmarks. Due to the standardization 
of health expenditures to capture a modal ben-
efit package for ESI coverage, premiums in the 
smaller firm sizes were somewhat higher than 
those reported in the MEPS-IC. They remained 
consistent with information gathered during 
a qualitative “field test” of our benchmarked 
model premiums (box).
Baseline Step I: Arriving at the final state-
specific baselines
Going through all the steps from A through H 
created the final baseline of microdata on indi-
viduals and families in each state. These base-
lines included premiums for everyone in each 
state’s population, by firm for those with access 
to ESI and for individuals and families in the 
non-group market. (The model contains infor-
mation on people with public and large-group 
coverages as well, but they were not a focus of 
this project.)
Step 2. Modeling reinsurance reform 
options
Specifying states’ reinsurance provisions to 
be modeled 
The modeling focused on excess-of-loss rein-
surance, also called corridor coverage, which 
is the type of reinsurance used in the Healthy 
NY program. This type of program reimburses 
the insurer for a specified percentage of spend-
ing per individual for the year in a specified 
corridor; the model used the calendar year, as 
Field Testing the Model’s Simulated Baseline Premiums for 
Each State
For completeness and on-the-ground credibility, we compared the MEPS-IC data on 
premiums with information obtained from several sources in each of the three par-
ticipating states about currently or recently prevailing premiums. The goal here was 
to ensure that state-level information is not inconsistent with MEPS and the adjusted 
model estimates.
Information on average or typical premiums was sought for four market segments: 
non-group, small-group, large-group, and state employees. We focused most heavily 
on small-group and non-group information, as those sectors are the ones of interest 
for state reforms. Non-group was particularly important, as MEPS-IC applies directly 
only to employment groups. Policy year premiums and demographic attributes where 
relevant were noted. If broad-based information was unavailable, we obtained premi-
ums for a proxy population. Sources included state and insurer Web pages, private 
and state reports, and surveys done within the states. Finally, we conducted tele-
phone interviews with key informants among insurers, state officials, and consulting 
actuaries during December 2006 and April-May 2007. 
We found reasonable consistency of these state-level data with workplace premiums 
as reported by the MEPS-IC survey. Non-group levels were also found to be most like 
those for very small workplace groups, as expected. The field testing, as intended, 
improved our confidence in the final fine tuning for each state’s baseline data set. Side 
benefits of this process included that it enriched project understanding of each state’s 
market, regulatory, and political environments, raised our project’s visibility and credibility 
at the state level, and helped solidify relationships with key actors within each state.
7in Healthy NY. Participating states specified 
alternative values for the lower limit of the rein-
surance corridor, upper limit of the reinsurance 
corridor (we also examined policies with no 
upper limit), and the coinsurance rate retained 
by the original insurer (also called the “carrier 
retention percentage”). The retention was typi-
cally either 10 percent or 20 percent. 
States also specified the eligibility rules for 
reinsurance reimbursement, that is, what types 
of coverage were eligible for claims reimburse-
ment. They all chose to target insurance either 
bought by small firms, in the non-group mar-
ket, or both. Income level of covered enrollees 
could also be specified, and Rhode Island asked 
for some simulation based on incomes. 
Applying reinsurance rules and computing 
change in premiums by risk group 
For each specification of reinsurance provisions, 
we computed the reinsurance-reimbursable 
health care spending under that option’s rules. 
To the extent that states subsidize the costs of 
insured expenses within the reinsurance corridor, 
insurers are able to reduce the premiums they 
charge to enrollees. The model assumes that 
insurers will fully pass on the value of the subsidy 
they receive in the form of lower premiums.23 
For each specification, we then computed the 
changes in premiums expected to occur by 
employer and within the non-group risk pool. 
We expected larger decreases in premiums to 
occur within risk pools that have a higher con-
centration of insured people with expenditures 
falling within the reinsurance corridor. For 
employees in non-offering firms whose cover-
age is eligible for the reinsurance subsidy, we 
applied the reinsurance rules to the distribution 
of expenditures that we estimated would occur 
if each employee in the non-offering firms 
were covered by employer-sponsored coverage. 
For example, we accounted for an increase in 
expected expenditures for the uninsured if they 
were to obtain ESI.
Step 3. Simulating changes in employer 
offer and individual take-up of coverage
Elasticity assumptions in the model 
To simulate changes in behavior due to rein-
surance-reduced prices, the model builds in 
“elasticity” figures, which estimate how much 
consumption of an item will change in response 
to a price change. The elasticities capture both 
how responsive is an employer’s decision to 
offer health insurance to health insurance costs 
faced by the firm and how responsive is an 
individual’s take-up of health insurance to the 
premium faced by the individual. The elasticities 
used come from a review of numerous empiri-
cal analyses (Exhibit 4)24.
The premium elasticity for non-group, single 
coverage is -0.6, for example. A negative elasticity 
indicates that consumption increases when price 
decreases, so -0.6 means that a 10 percent decrease 
in non-group single premiums is expected to result 
in a 6.0 percent increase in the probability of single 
individuals’ taking up such coverage. Smaller firms 
are more responsive to price changes than are 
larger ones, and among non-group buyers, those 
considering single coverage are more responsive 
than those seeking family coverage. 
Details of method for applying elasticities:  In some 
applications, it is reasonable to assume that elastici-
ties are constant within a broad range of prices. 
Assuming constant elasticities for probabilistic 
outcomes like insurance choice, however, is likely 
to be a poor approximation of individual behavior, 
especially as baseline probabilities approach 0 or 
1 or when the baseline probability of a particular 
individual or subgroup is far from the average 
baseline probability.25 The same concern would 
apply if we were to assume a constant percentage 
point change in probability. Because we were inter-
ested in the distribution of effects and not simply 
average effects, our method needed to adequately 
handle heterogeneous effects.  
We also faced the methodological problem that 
it is preferable to apply elasticities from exter-
nal studies to populations comparable to those 
from which those elasticities were estimated, 
but we needed elasticity estimates for different 
individuals and subpopulations than those of 
prior studies.
Our solution was to incorporate heterogeneous 
effects into the application of elasticities. We 
used the same methodological approach when 
applying the technique to employer offer behav-
ior and to individuals’ take-up behavior of ESI 
or non-group health insurance. Our method 
had four general steps:  
In the first step, we computed the predicted prob-
ability of a firm’s offering ESI, of an employee or 
dependent’s having ESI if they receive an offer, 
and of having non-group coverage. 
In the second step, we computed the value of a 
hypothetical probit coefficient on the premium 
covariate that would make the average probit 
marginal effect consistent with the change in 
probability implied by the target elasticity.  
In the third step, we computed a firm-specific 
or person-specific new predicted probability 
of offer or of coverage, and the change in the 
probability of offer or of taking-up coverage, 
which was dependent upon three components: 
• The initial predicted probabilities;  
 
• The percentage change in premium in the risk 
group; and 
•  The value that makes the average marginal 
effect of the premium consistent with the 
target elasticity.  
Source: Urban Institute review of multiple studies estimating premium elasticities of insurance coverage.
Targeted Beneficiary of Reinsurance Premium Elasticity
Employer Offer Rate by Size of Firm
1 to 9 employees
10 to 24 employees
25 to 50 employees
-1.16
-0.45
-0.4
Employee Take-Up Rate, once Given Offer
Single Coverage
Family Coverage
-0.015
-0.03
Non-Group Buyers
Single Coverage
Family Coverage
-0.6
-0.3
Exhibit 4. Premium Elasticities Used in Reinsurance Model
8In the fourth and final step, we compared the 
change in the probability of coverage to a per-
son-specific threshold for ESI take-up, where 
the threshold is a function of a random variable 
and the predicted probability of coverage. If the 
threshold was below the predicted probability, 
the firm was deemed to offer or the individual 
was deemed to take up coverage.
Our method used the probit equation as its cen-
tral step, which enabled us to estimate individual- 
or employer-specific changes in the probability of 
taking/offering coverage that are consistent over-
all with our target elasticities; extrapolate well to 
individuals/employers with different conditional/
baseline probabilities of take-up/offer and cases 
where changes in premiums may be large; and 
generate reasonable individual-/employer-level 
heterogeneity in response probabilities. Specifics 
of the application of this method to simulation 
of changes in employer offer or individual take-
up are discussed below.
Simulating changes in employer offer, 
employee take-up, and non-group purchase
The elasticities were then applied within each 
aspect of insurance purchase where price 
change matters: first, to employers’ decisions 
to offer coverage, then to employees’ (and 
dependents’) decisions to accept the offers, 
then to decisions of individuals and households 
(HIUs) whether to buy non-group coverage. 
All of these responses to changes in price can 
vary by firms’ and individuals’ preferences, as 
noted above. Therefore, we wanted to approxi-
mate the distribution of firms’ and individuals’ 
responses to a reinsurance subsidy observed 
in the real world by including a random com-
ponent in our application of elasticities, while 
preserving the overall average value reported in 
economics literature.26
To estimate changes in establishments’ offers of 
ESI, we generated a single percentage change in 
premiums for each establishment, computed as 
a weighted average of the percentage changes 
in premiums for single coverage and family 
coverage. We then computed a percentage point 
change in the probability of offer based on the 
calibrated probit function of offer for establish-
ments. Employers whose insured claims are not 
eligible for reinsurance will have no change in 
premiums. Those eligible for reinsurance will 
shift from not offering to offering if their new 
predicted probability of offer is greater than 
their fixed threshold.
With respect to individual take-up of ESI, we 
proceeded as follows. For employees in estab-
lishments that offered coverage at baseline, 
we assigned a random threshold for taking up 
coverage in a manner analogous to the way we 
generated thresholds to determine employer 
offer. For employees in establishments that do 
not offer coverage at baseline, we assign thresh-
olds simply as a random draw from a uniform 
distribution between 0 and 1. 
We computed the percentage change in the full 
single and family premiums after reinsurance. 
We assumed that employers will not adjust the 
share of the full premium that they pay, so that 
the percent change in the share of premium that 
the worker pays will be the same as the percent-
age change in the full premium. Employees in 
establishments that offer coverage at baseline 
but who did not take up the coverage will 
change to taking up the coverage if their new 
predicted probability of take-up is above their 
threshold value. These effects will tend to be 
small because the target elasticities are small.
Employees in establishments that do not offer cov-
erage at baseline but do offer coverage after rein-
surance will take up coverage if the predicted prob-
ability of take-up is greater than their threshold 
value. These effects will tend to be larger because 
expected ESI take-up rates are generally high.
With respect to individual take-up of non-group 
coverage, we assume that individuals with ESI 
will not switch to non-group coverage. For the 
uninsured and those with non-group coverage at 
baseline, we assigned thresholds for taking up non-
group coverage analogous to the thresholds for 
employer offer of group coverage. We computed 
the change in the probability of taking up non-
group single coverage or family coverage, based on 
changes in the premium for each product and our 
probit equations. Individuals whose new predicted 
probability of having non-group coverage exceeded 
these thresholds; they and their dependents were 
assigned to non-group coverage.
Final recomputation of effects on premiums 
and on insurance purchase
Through this initial round of simulations, the 
model proceeded as follows: Starting with the 
baseline data, which included our initial premi-
um estimates for group and non-group premi-
ums, we applied a particular reinsurance speci-
fication and recomputed group and non-group 
premiums given the reinsurance subsidies, but 
before any changes in the behavior of employ-
ers or individuals. The model then allowed 
our simulated employers to respond to these 
changes in premiums by switching their offer 
status from non-offering to offering. Next, 
individuals and their dependents are allowed to 
change their coverage status based on changes 
in premiums and the actions of employers. 
This initial cycle of subsidy and response simu-
lated changes in the baseline composition of 
employer groups and non-group risk pools. 
Accordingly, we next recomputed the changes 
in premiums from their baseline levels. In so 
Microsimulation Model for Reinsurance
 
 
 
Baseline data
including initial
premiums
5. Compute
ESI/NG premiums
for new risk pool
1. Specify
reinsurance
policy
parameters
2. Recompute
ESI/NG premiums
3. Compute
ESI offer
changes
4. Compute
changes in
take-up
of ESI/NG
Source: Authors’ graphic. Note: ESI is employer-sponsored insurance; 
NG is non-group insurance (also called “individual” of “direct-pay” coverage).
Exhibit 5. Modeling the Dynamics of Reinsurance: Iterative Flow of Simulated Impacts 
9doing, we account for the fact that the newly 
insured will have higher levels of health expen-
ditures than they did when uninsured (Exhibit 
5). Because these second-order changes in pre-
miums are small, further iterations of the model 
were unnecessary.
Step 4. Computing overall costs of 
reinsurance policy and tabulating the 
model’s results
The final step in the reinsurance modeling was 
to tally and report the estimated policy effects 
of each reinsurance option simulated. We 
totaled the program costs to the state. These 
included the costs of reinsuring health expen-
ditures for the eligible population who were 
already insured at baseline as well as the cost of 
reinsuring those who gained insurance coverage 
as a result of the policy.
We reported to states the aggregate estimated 
reduction in the number of uninsured and the 
change in the number of uninsured by type of 
coverage. Beyond net coverage changes, we 
cross-tabulated coverage post-reform against 
baseline coverage to show the full extent of the 
coverage transitions that are estimated to occur. 
We also reported policy effects by subgroups of 
interest such as by family income as a percent 
of the federal poverty level and establishment 
size categories.
The state-specific outputs are presented in separate 
deliverables, one for each participating state.27
Strengths and Limitations of the 
Reinsurance Model
Modeling abstracts from reality, sufficiently sim-
plifying complexities to clarify overall relation-
ships and effects. Substantial efforts were made 
to benchmark the models’ components to state 
characteristics, to prevailing premiums, and to 
documented employer and consumer responses 
to price change. The model can assess overall 
effect of reinsurance alternatives on premiums, 
coverage, and costs; which firms offer coverage 
and which people take up what coverage, when 
the benefits of reduced premiums are distrib-
uted in alternative ways; how the composition 
of insured risk pools change, with secondary 
impacts on premiums; and changes in the com-
position of the uninsured population. While the 
model has data on out-of-pocket and insured 
costs to enrollees, we must simulate potential 
health spending under insurance to those who 
are currently uninsured. A strength of the 
model already noted is that it contains 
good information on the uninsured and their 
circumstances—unlike insurance claims data, 
for example—which substantially increases the 
validity of estimates of expected reinsurance 
costs.  
However, some uncertainty remains about the 
model’s findings on the magnitude of employ-
ers’ and individuals’ behavioral effects from 
reinsurance. Moreover, the simulation results 
are not budgetary estimates, as actual pro-
gram spending would also depend upon many 
design and implementation choices. The model 
simulates employers’ and individuals’ behavior, 
not insurers’ behavior. In a sense, it estimates 
premiums for each market segment (here, non-
group and small-group) as though there were 
competing insurers that act the same, and all 
coverage follows state rules. It is not possible 
to simulate every player in the insurance market 
that provides coverage to small firms or their 
employees. The model does not address issues 
of insurance market competitiveness or estimate 
possible entry or exit from the markets, nor 
does it include variations in insurance benefits 
across carriers or market segments. In order to 
better estimate consumer response to premium 
change, it holds benefit design constant. 
Finally, insurers’ different underwriting and 
pricing behaviors are not modeled, and results 
accordingly do not include how different insur-
ers might respond differently to reinsurance in 
marketing and pricing. The model assumes that 
carriers pass through 100 percent of the reinsur-
ance subsidy into lower premiums, and continue 
to manage high-cost claims as before. Different 
assumptions could increase estimated govern-
ment spending on reinsurance and/or reduce 
the impacts on coverage.
Model construction lacked information from 
which to simulate insurer underwriting; it 
assumed open enrollment into all available 
coverages (which is required by federal law for 
small-group coverage, but not for non-group 
insurance). Variations of premiums across sub-
populations of people that arise from coverage 
through different insurers are not simulated, nor 
are differences across separate blocks of cover-
age that an insurer may price separately based on 
factors other than underlying expenditures. The 
model for each state was constructed, however, 
to accurately reflect the average premium for all 
small firms as well as the variation in premiums 
by firm size observed among all small firms.
Conclusion
The Reinsurance Institute’s microsimulation 
model was designed to assess the overall effects 
of reinsurance alternatives on premiums, cov-
erage, and costs. Further, it estimates which 
firms will begin to offer coverage as a result of 
reforms and which people take up what cover-
age when the benefits of reduced premiums 
are distributed in alternative ways.  The model 
estimates how the composition of insured risk 
pools change, and the secondary impacts on 
premiums that result, as well as changes in the 
composition of the uninsured population. Our 
experience testing, refining, and then applying 
the reinsurance microsimulation model in three 
states confirmed both the reasonableness of its 
outputs as well as its utility in analyzing alterna-
tive policies.  
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group), August 2005.
25 For example, previous studies have found that those with 
lower incomes have larger elasticities, whereas those in 
worse health are relatively inelastic with respect to price 
(CBO, 2005; Marquis et al. 2004; Blumberg et al. 2001). 
26 To achieve this distribution, we predicted the likelihood that 
a firm or individual would want to change behavior under a 
reinsurance subsidy, and compared this toan assigned random 
variable between 0 and 1 to determine whether the firm or 
individual indeed would change behavior (that is, decide 
to offer or take-up an offer of insurance). Modeling of this 
decision incorporated a degree of randomness that served to 
approximate the distribution of behavioral responses observed 
in the real world.
27 See documents cited in note 2 above.
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